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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE VAN 




RALPH W. FARRAR and HELEN R. FARRAR, ) 
his wife, Defendants. and SEAGULL IN-
VESTMENT COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellaat, 
vs. 
LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE VAN 
ZYVERDEN, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 9945 
No. 9946 
Brief of Respondents and Cross-.L-\ppellants 
l"ROSS-.. :\PPEAL, l".~.-\SE XO. 9945 
c.oJne no"~ the plaintiffs and respondents in case 
~~ o. 9945. X o. 2449 in the trial court. and hereby cross-
appeal to the (Ttah Supreme Court from the Judgment 
an(l Decree entered by the trial court on plaintiff's 
con1plaint in s:1id case X o. :2-!49. said judgn1ent having 
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been entered on the 14th day of June, 1963, the plain-
tiffs' motion for new trial having been denied on the 
5th day of July, 1963. Appellant's brief herein was 
served and filed on September 6, 1963. 
STA'l"'EMEN'l' OE., CASE ON 1\_PPEAL 
'l,he buyers under a Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court for the 
purpose of adjudicating their rights to damages, and, 
alternatively, for specific performance as a consequence 
of defendants having failed to perform certain promises 
according to the intentions of the parties at the time 
the contract was executed. This case was assigned No. 
2449 in the court below. The assignee of the sellers filed 
a cross-complaint in the same action, and, alternatively 
in a second case (No. 2456 below) urged the court to 
grant a judgment against the buyers for alleged unla~r­
ful detainer and possession of the property. 
DISPOSI'l,ION IN LOWER COURT 
The cases being consolidated for trial, the lower 
court found against the buyers in No. 2449 (No. 9945 
on appeal) and against the sellers in both No. 2449 and 
2456 (No. 9945 and 9946 on appeal) . The court entered 
no cause of action against all parties. 
RELIEF, SOCGHT ON APPEAL 
'l.,he buyers urg'e this court on appeal to affir1n the 
judgment of the trial court whereby the sellers were 
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denied relief for alleged unla,vful detainer and for 
restitution of the pretnises. 'rhe buyers urge that the 
trial eourt's j udgtnent against them on their original 
rotnplaint be reversed and that a ne'v trial be U\\·arded 
\rherehy they \vould be afforded an opportunity to prove 
the :unoun t of datnages ''" hich they have sustained as a 
result of the sellers' breach, and that such damages be 
on·-sct against any liability to the sellers in the nature of 
payntents due under the contract. Buyers urge this court 
to instruct the trial court to determine the rights of the 
parties, and order that the sellers be required to convey 
the land involved to buyers upon such perfortnance as 
is found to be due. 
S'l'.Li. TE)lENT OF !?ACTS 
The central and controlling issues in this litigation 
involYe an interpretation of the intention of the parties 
in connection \Vith the execution of a certain real estate 
contract for the purchase and sale of a ranch at the 
n1outh of Daniels Canyon in ''r asatch County. The 
property involved is referred to in the record as the 
"Daniels ("reek Ranch." That name '"ill be applied to 
it for convenience in this brief. Because of the impor-
tance of the circumstances of the execution of the agree-
tnent and the kno,vledge of the parties of the prior his-
tory of the operation of previous o'vners and tenants, 
it is necessary to describe in some detail the relationship 
of the parties and the factual circumstances under "·hich 
the agree1nent "·as negotiated. 
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On or about January 12, 1957, Ralph ,V. I~,arrar 
and Helen R. Farrar, his "·ife, defendants in No. ~449~ 
acquired an interest in the Daniels Creek Ranch by 
entering into an agreement to purchase the sa1ne fron1 
La'' erda Lynn (Exhibit 7). The Farrars first leased 
the ranch to a ~Ir. Van Camp, who had prior experience 
in the dairy business. Mr. ''an Camp attempted to oper-
ate the ranch as a dairy but he failed in that enterprise 
and cancelled the lease (R. 570-571). The next occupant 
of the premises "ras a Mr. Mecham, who \vas in pos-
session for approximately one and one-half years (R. 
572). Then a man called Collier had the premises for 
one and one-half years. Mr. Collier agreed to pay 
$66,000 for the property. Mr. LaMont Bowers then 
occupied the ranch for approximately one and one-half 
years. Subsequent to Mr. Bowers, Aluminum Roofing 
Company occupied the ranch, apparently under some 
arrangement with Bowers. Each one of these tenants 
in sequence attempted to operate the premises as a dairy 
farm (R. 573-577). Each one of these tenants was un-
able to meet his commitments, either as buyers or lessees 
of the premises. 
Some time prior to September 25, 1960, Mr. Farrar 
called upon Leo '!an Zyverden in response to a ne,vs-
paper advertisement of ';an Zyverden on some other 
property. l"Ir. }..,arrar explained that he had the Daniels 
Creek Ranch for sale and arrangements were made for 
Mr. ''an Zyverden to see it (R. 498, 499). l\Ir. Farrar 
explained that he was foreclosing on the people 'vho had 
been in possession of the place and told ''an ZyYerden 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the prior oeeupants had attetnpted to operate n 
dairy (It. ~300). 'I'he condition of the barns and buildings 
was inspceted. ~lr. \"an Zyverden explained to }4.,atTar 
that the place 'vottld continue to be unsuccessful as a 
dairy and that hit should be converted into a beef 
operation" (R. 500-501}. :\Ir. \"an Zyverden testified 
that he showed ~__,arrar that by converting the tnain 
ranch into a grazing operation and leaving approxi-
tnately a7 to 40 acres at the airport in hay, that the 
enterprise could be operated tnuch n1ore econotnically 
than as a stnall dairy. He specifically explained that 
he \\rould expect to run 100 head of cattle (R. ~>1U-.3~0). 
~Ir. l1,arrar a<lmitted that he told ~lr. 'Tan Zyverden 
of the prior history of the ranch and the he kne'v that 
:\Ir. '"an Zyverden intended to convert it fron1 a dairy 
to a beef operation. He realized that the only manner 
that he could expect to be paid for the property "·as to 
enable the purchaser to convert from dairy to beef. He 
realized that the milk base and the milking equipment 
on the pretnises had no value to a beef raiser and that 
he took that fact into account "Then he signed the pur-
chase agreetnent 'vith the ,.,.. an Zyverden (R. 578-579). 
~Ir. , ... an Zyverden testified directly that he told 
Farrar he "Tas not interested in the ranch as a dairy 
operation and that Farrar said he 'vould pernut a 
con,Tersion into a beef ranch (R. 503). )lr. , ... an Zyver-
den explained that in order to convert into a beef oper-
ation the milk equipn1ent and base 'vould have to be sold 
or exchanged into beef (R. 503). , ... an Zyverden ex-
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plained to }__,arrar that he had no 1noney hin1self to go 
into the beef business but that he had some Inachinery 
and livestock and horses in Roosevelt and other places 
and he would use this property as a down payment by 
placing the assets on the ranch and permitting the seller 
to retain a security interest in such property as 'vell as 
the }-,arrar assets subject to the sale (R. 503). l 1.,arrar 
and Van Zyverden decided that since it was then the fall 
of the year and winter was approaching, there \vas no 
feed on the premises, the milk base would be sold and the 
money would be retained by 11-,arrar until such ti1ne as 
the weather would open up in the spring and could be 
used to purchase livestock ( R. 505) . The purchase 
agreement which was executed by the parties is in the 
record as Exhibit I. For the most part it is a standard 
Uniform Real Estate Contract. The "rider" provides, 
among other things, that "It is agreed that the Hi-Land 
milk base ... and all milking equipment as above men-
tioned, can be exchanged for livestock or horses of equal 
value, remaining security for the period of two years 
as agreed above." At the time this agreement was exe-
cuted Mr. Farrar knew that there was a provision in 
his original contract "·ith La Verda Lynn whereby he 
was prevented from conveying the base, unless, of course, 
the seller would consent. The language of the Lynn 
agreement relevant to the problem is as follows: 
"It is understood and agreed that the Hi-
Land milk base and 100 shares of capital stock 
in the Hi-Land tnilk co1npany is included in the 
sale, and that base is non-transferable during the 
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~lr. ~,alTar 1uhnitted that he did not tell \"an 
Zyvcrden anything about the litnitation of the transfer-
ability of the tnilk base as contained in Exhibit a at the 
ti1ne of the execution of the agreement ( R. 576). lie 
ll'stitied that he had "mental reservations'' about the 
rnilk base at the ti1ne he signed the agreement 'vith '"'"an 
Zyverden but he did not discuss thetn "·ith \"'"an Zy-
Yerden ( R. 576, 577). 
'l'he eYidence is thus clear and uncontradicted that 
at the time the parties executed the agreement, Ralph 
\\r. l 1,arrar knew ~Ir. \'"an Zyverden intended that the 
rnilk base and equip1nent "ras to be used to assist in 
financing the 'ran Zyverden beef operation. It is only 
reasonable to conclude that 1\Ir. Farrar did not expect 
:\I r. :\Iickelson, the assignee of the seller's interest under 
Exhibit 3, to raise any substantial objection to the trans-
fer of the base; therefore he was perfectly 'villing to 
undertake the obligation to enable ,.,. an Zyverden to 
transfer the milk base and milking equipment in order 
to raise capital for a beef operation. Farrar was suffi-
ciently shrewd and logical to realize that only by under-
taking that obligation could a sale be made to the ,.,. an 
Zyverdens on the property. 
After the agreement was signed, ~ir. Farrar had 
possession of it for some period of time for the purpose 
of getting his 'vife's signature. He struck out of the 
description of the property to be sold the language 
relatina to 100 shares of stock of Hi-Land dairy and 0 • 
approxin1ately t\\'0 or three "reeks later urged :\Ir. ,.,. an 
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Zyverden to consent to such procedure. Mr. ''"an Zy-
verden agreed to the amendment (R. 506-507). It is 
clear, ho,vever, that ~..,arrar had plenty of time to study 
the provisions of the agreement with respect to the Hi-
Land milk base between these t'vo dates. 
Between September and approximately the 1niddle 
of November, ')'"an Zyverden and Farrar had additional 
discussions with respect to converting the milk base to 
beef cattle (R. 509-510). Van Zyverden obtained fro1n 
Hi-Land the name of a prospective purchaser of the 
base named Pert. He requested that Farrar write a letter 
to Hi-Land asking permission to transfer the base to 
his prospect (R. 510-511). Mr. Farrar was very pleased 
that he had a sale and indicated to Van Zyverden that 
the sooner it 'vas sold, the better. Pert would pay $10 a 
pound for whatever part of the base Hi-Land would 
transfer, and this arrangement was acceptable to Farrar 
(R. 512). Farrar assured ':an Zyverden that he would 
immediately contact Hi-Land and ask them to transfer 
the base to Mr. Pert. 
Mr. Farrar wrote to Mr. Van Zyverden on Novem-
ber 2 (Exhibit 2), stating that he had "stopped at Hi-
Land dairy and found that there are 479 pounds of base. 
This would be reduced to 378 pounds ... in the event of 
a sale. I see no reason why this cannot be sold to an 
individual at a price of not less than $3,000 and if it were 
worked on a trade for livestock would bring possibly 
1nore. Inasmuch as you do not plan to put stock on the 
farm this fall as was originally agreed, it will be neces-
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sary to ha ,.e the nlolley derived fron1 the sale of the base 
plaeed in an aceount in tny narne until such tirne as stock 
'vill be purchased .... I suggest that the base and tanks 
be sold as conveniently us possible., 
On Decetnber ~7, :\lr. ~-,arrar \vrote to Hi-Land 
dairy approving I:>ert as a buyer and requesting that 
the base be transferred to hin1. Farrar admitted that this 
letter "·as sent at ~lr. \~an Zyverden\ request and that 
its purpose \vas to enable the sale or exchange of the 
1nilk base pursuant to their agreement (R. 581-.>82}. 
)lr. },arrar did not advise l\Ir. ~Iickelson of the 
proposed tranefer to Pert. l-Ie did not ask ~lr. ~Iickel­
son to consent to the assignment. 
'l"he con1pelling evidentiary force of I~.,arrar's con-
duet at this ti1ne, however, is that he admitted that he 
"'as acting to perform his obligations to , ... an Zyverden. 
lie agreed to the Pert sale, tried to complete it quickly, 
and instructed Mr. l"" an Zyverden that the money '\Vas 
to be banked in his name until spring "·hen cattle could 
be purchased. 
In failing to obtain )lr. Mickelsen's approval in 
advance, Farrar miscalculated. ''Then l\Ir. ~Iickelsen 
learned of the Farrar request he adYised Hi-Land that 
he had a security interest in the base and that they should 
. . 
not allo"~ any transfer 'vithout his consent. 
'!"hereafter, Farrnr did not attempt to resolve the 
1natter "·ith ~1ickelsen so that he could perform the 
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obligation contained in the 'ran Zyverden contract. 
Hi-Land declined to allow the transfer without :\Iickcl-
sen's consent. 
Prior to the time of the trial, Farrar had never 
advised Mr. 'Tan Zyverden that he could perform by 
making a sale or exchange to Mr. Pert or to any other 
person (R. 587). As of November I, 1962, Mr. and :Jlrs. 
Farrar assigned their interest under the contract to the 
defendant Seagull Investment Company (Exhibit 10). 
Seagull agreed that it would keep, observe and perfor1n 
"all of the terms, conditions and provisions of said 
agreement that are to be kept, observed and performed 
by the assignors." 
The \ran Zyverdens made a tender of proof at the 
trial with respect to damages. In addition to the machin-
ery and livestock which the buyers delivered to the 
sellers as down payment on the premises, \ran Zyverden 
made improvements in the nature of new pump, fence 
additions, well repairs and other co1nparable capital ex-
penditures involving cash or equivalent payments of 
$8,812.00 (R. 222). At the trial, plaintiff offered to 
prove that there were specific discussions with Mr. Far-
rar concerning the profit which the buyer could have 
made if he had been able to exchange the tnilk base for 
young livestock ( R. 523, 524) . The offered testimony 
would have been to the effect that the money received 
frotn the sale of the Hi-Land milk base or the cattle 
received on any exchange would provide the capital 
necessary for a cattle operation. The amounts received 
10 
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frutn the sale \\'ottld be sufficient to purchase a pproxi-
nuttely 100 head of young cal Yes . ..L\ t t\vo pounds of gain 
per day during the grazing season, the increase on these 
l'attle \\·ould proYide sufficient funds to Inake the pay-
llletlts under the contract in the fall and some additional 
snudl profit to the operator. ~lr. Farrar "·as told in 
substance and effect that this was the precise manner 
in 'rhich the purchaser intended to make paytnent. :\Ir. 
I~,arrar recognized that these projections of \ran Zy\·er-
den "\Vere substantially accurate and it \vas agreeable 
'vith hi1n that the operations should be so conducted. 
'rhe 'vitness offered to testify that 100 young dairy 
rattle hav-ing an ayerage \\'eight of 300 lbs. in the spring 
\Vould gain on the average t\vo pounds per day, taking 
into account reasonably anticipated losses. The evidenc-e 
\\·as offered in support of two propositions: First, that 
the parties intended and agreed at the time of the exe-
cution of the contract that the sellers enabling the milk 
base to be exchanged for beef cattle was a conditional 
performance to the performance of the buyer~ and sec-
ondly, that under the theory of Hadley Y. Baxendale 
and Sections 330-331 of the Restatement of Contracts 
the buyer "·as entitled to recover loss of profits because 
they 'vere anticipated by the parties (R. 523-526). 
After Farrar had been unable or unwilling to ob-
tain )liekelsen's consent to the transfer of the base, and 
during· the ti1ne he knew that , .. an Zyverden \Vas looking 
to hin1 to obtain the result, he assigned his interest in the 
contract to Seagull InYestn1ent Con1pany. The assign-
Inent provides explicitly that the assignee assumes all 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the assignors' obligations under the contract (Ex. 7, 
R. 242, Para. 3). 
When Seagull refused to negotiate any solution 
with the ,.,. an Zyverdens (R. 288), they filed their com-
plaint in No. 2449 (R. 3, 4). The summons and conl-
plaint in No. 2~1449 were served upon Seagull on Decenl-
ber 14, 1961 (R. 16). Seagull served a '"Notice of 
Termination of Contract and Five Day Notice to 'T acate 
Premises" upon the 'Tan Zyverdens on January l, 1962 
( R. 266-273) , but did not answer the complaint in the 
action filed until after the prescribed 20 days had ex-
pired ( R. 19) . Instead, they filed a new complaint, 
No. 2456, for alleged unlawful detainer, on January 16, 
1962 (R. 258-273). Plaintiffs in No. 2449 tnoved for 
dismissal of No. 2456 on the ground that such pleading 
was a compulsory counterclai1n in the first action, and 
that the default constituted a judgment ,,,hich was res 
adjudicata (R. 274-276). 
After the default certificate against Seagull in No. 
2449 had been entered, and before it had been set aside, 
Seagull filed some requests for admissions in that action. 
Plaintiffs moved that they be stricken on the ground 
that Seagull's default had been entered and it had no 
standing in the case (R. 25). 'Vithout waiting for rul-
ings on the pending motions, Seagull had the clerk of 
the court enter a "default certificate" against plaintiffs 
in No. 2449 for failing to answer the requests for admis-
sions (R. 294). Seagull's motion for reinstatement \vas 
granted and its motion for summary judgment denied 
12 
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( It. ~B~3, ~98} . .. \II of the infor1nn t ion referred to in the 
rt·quests for ~uhnissions \Vas subsequently obtained 
through \vrittt·n and oral interrogatories. 
Seagull subsequently serYed n second notice. Ex-
hibit ~> ( R. ~a a) stating that ''this notice shall in no ,,·ay 
ntl'ect the existing legal proceeding no'v pending con-
cerning said property ... '' 
1\t no titne during the trial, or subsequently, did 
Seagull offer to file a supplemental complaint. As late 
as July, 1963, n1ore than six months after the trial, Sea-
.~·ull "~as demanding payments allegedly due in "N ovetn-
ber, 1962 (R. 723-725). 'l.,he 1962 payments 'vere due, 
if at all, at least ten months after the service of Exhibit 
.3. clearly indicating that any termination of the right 




THE COUR'l., ERRED IN FAILIXG TO 
FIND THr\..T THE PARTIES IN1,EXDED 
'fliA'f THE SELLER ASSU)IE THE OBLI-
G.L-\'fiOX O:F' EX ABLING THE B"l.,.l.,.ER TO 
l~OX, ... ERT THE )!ILK BASE AND EQ"LTIP-
:\IEX'f TO LI, ... ESTOCK. 
'l.,he contract provided that: "It is agreed that the 
Hi-Land 1nilk base ... and all milking equipinent as 
13 
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above mentioned, can be exchanged for livestock or 
horses of equal value, re1naining security for the period 
of t\\,.O years as agreed above." 'l,he \ran Zyverdeus 
asked the court to construe the agree1nent to the effect 
that the Farrars warranted that the 'Tan Zyverdens 
would be enabled to exchange the milk base and equip-
ment for livestock. The trial court failed to make such 
a finding. 'l,he conduct of the parties and the admissions 
of Farrar under oath at the trial demonstrate conclu-
sively that this ruling of the trial court was erroneous. 
A. The intentions of the parties are co·ntrolling. This 
court has uniformly held that the trial court should 
determine the actual intention of the parties to the con-
tracts in the light of such extrinsic evidence as is a Yail-
able to determine such intentions. In Burt v. String-
fellow et al._, (1914) 45 Ut. 207, 143 P. 234, the court 
said: 
"In case, however, a construction is called for, 
the to rule to be applied is well stated in 2 Elliott 
on Contracts ( 1913) Section 1508, in the follow-
ing words: 
'\Vhen a contract is ambiguous and open to 
construction, the true end to be reached is to 
ascertain what the parties intended, and when 
that intention is found it prevails over verbal 
inaccuracies, inapt expressions, and the dry 
words of the stipulations. ,-fhe court should, as 
far as possible, place itself in the position of 
the parties ",.hen their minds met upon the 
terms of the agreement, and then fro1n a con-
sideration of the writing itself, its purpose, and 
the circumstances surrounding the transaction, 
14 
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endeavor to asl'ertnin '"hat thev intended and 
\\'hat tht'y agreed to do; i.e. upon \\'hat sense 
or tnea n i ng of the tertns use. their n1inds actu-
ally 1net. ~rhe purpose of all rules for the cou-
sti'uction of eontracts is to aid in ascertainino· 
the intention of the parties fro1n a constructio~ 
of the whole agreement.' 
''I 11 other ·nHJrds, the rules of conBtruction 
should be considered as ser7~onts, and not a.'t 
nulsfcr.,.,·. and tluts one rule should not be gh,cn 
undue pro1nincnce rt)hile another is given but 
~~diyh t or no effect.'' ( En1phasis supplied.) 
Applying the rule in the satne case the court stated : 
"~l,he question that '"e must detertnine. there-
fore, is: ''rhat \vas the intention of the parties to 
the contract ... at the time it "'as entered into .... 
In case parties have entered into a contract and 
differ \\'ith regard to its meaning, and the terms 
of the contract are doubtful or a1nbiguous. the 
first duty of the court is to ascertain the actual 
intention of the parties at the time the contract 
\vas entered into. This intention must be deter-
nlined frotn the language used by the parties 
when applied to the subject-matter of the con-
tract and the circtunseances and conditions sur-
rounding the parties." 
The Burt case \vas cited and its teachings applied 
in [Tdy v. Jemen (192~), 63 Ut. 95,222 P. 597, ""here 
the court said : 
"The fortn of expression is inapt and a"'k,vard, 
but. in the light of the circtunstances and condi-
tions surrounding the parties. the Ineaning is 
clear. The actual intention of the parties n1ust 
prevail over dry \\'"ords, inapt expressions. and 
15 
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careless recitation in the contract, unless that in-
tention is contrary to the plain sense and binding 
words of the agreement. Caine v. Hagenbarth, 
37 Utah, 69, 106 Pac. 945. 
" 'The best construction is that which is made 
by viewing the subject of the contract, as the 
mass of mankind would view it; for it 1nay be 
safely assumed that such was the aspect in which 
the parties themselves viewed it. A result thus 
obtained is exactly what is obtained from the 
cardinal rule of intention.' Schuylkill, etc. Co. v. 
Moore_, 2 What. (Pa.) 490." 
B. The contemporaneous conduct of the parties 
evidences an intention whereby the seller was obligated 
to obtain the exchange of the milk base. Seagull Invest-
ment Company argued at the trial that the transfer of 
the base to ,ran Zyverden in the spring of 1961 con-· 
stituted compliance with the contract. This, however, 
appears to be spurious. The agreement is explicit that 
the seller was obligated to transfer to the buyer the milk 
base as well as all other property subject to the sale. 
The buyer was to receive the right and power to exchange 
the milk base for livestock or horses of equal value. 
Unless the buyer was to have the right to make such 
an exchange to someone else, the specific language in 
question would be meaningless and superfluous. Thus 
it is clear from the agreement itself that the 'ran Zyver-
dens expected to exchange the milk base for livestock, 
and the agreement could not have been satisfied by the 
transfer of the base to the l'" an Zyverdens. 
'fhe construction placed upon the agreement by 
16 
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the pnrties thenlsel,·es conten1plates that ~~arrar under-
tcok the ohligatio11 to enable the exchange. In ('ainc r. 
1/aycnbart!t (1910), a7 Ut. 69. 106 P. 945, the eourt 
a ppro,·cs the rule that the construction placed upon an 
:tgreetnent hy the parties is controlling. "'\ t page 81 of 
the lT tah Reporter the court said: 
.. So the general paran1ount intent controls the 
special intent, and in this \\·ay it sometitnes 
becon1es necessary either to enlarge or to restrict 
the ordinary Ineaning of \Vords in order to pre-
serve the paran1ount intent of the parties to the 
agree1nent. ( ~ Paige on l.,o11tracts, Sec. 1113.) 
One of the cardinal rules requires that 'as bet\veen 
t\vo constructions, each probable, one of "·hich 
Blakes the contract fair and reasonable and the 
other of "·hich Blakes it unfair and unreasonable, 
the fortner should al\\·ays be preferred.' ( ~ J>aige 
on Contracts. Sec. llil.) r\nother author, \vhose 
\vork on contracts has, for many years. been rec-
ognized as a standard authority, natnely. Parsons 
on Contracts, in ,.,. oltune 2 (9th Ed.) , star page 
494, says: 'The first point is usually to ascertain 
"·hat the parties themselves meant and under-
stood.' " 
Applying the rule in that case, the court said at 
page 96: 
"'The more that ''?e have reflected upon the 
questions involved and the more "·e have con-
sidered the language contained in the contract 
\vhen Yie,ved in the light afforded by the subject-
Inntter and the surrounding circumstances herein 
detailed. the n1ore haYe \Ve become convinced that 
appellant's contention ought to prevaiL and that 
the trial court. in construing the language con-
17 
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tained in the contract, overlooked the doctrine 
which is well expressed in the scriptural text, that 
it is 'not of the letter, but the spirit; for the letter 
killeth, but the spirit giveth life.' " 
At least four salient uncontradicted facts support 
the construction that the parties intended that Farrar 
warranted that the base could be exchanged for livestock 
or horses of equal value: 
First: The parties to the agreement kne\v that prior 
efforts to operate a dairy farm on the property had been 
unsuccessful. 1_1--.,arrar testified in substance that each of 
the four prior operators of the ranch since the time he 
had an interest in it had attempted a dairy operation 
and had failed (R. 570-577). At the time of the negotia-
tions with Van Zyverden, in fact, LaMont Bowers, 
the immediate past occupant, was in default under a con-
tract and it was necessary to give him a Notice to Quit 
the Pre!fiises in order to complete the deal with ,,.,. an 
Zyverdens. Farrar admitted that he told Van Zyverden 
of the prior history of the operation and that he kne\v 
that ,.,. an Zyverden intended to convert the place to a 
livestock operation. He admitted that he realized in 
negotiating the contract that the milk base and the 
milking equipment on the premises had no value to a 
beef raiser and that he took such facts into account when 
he signed the purchase agreement ( R. 578-579) . It is 
unreasonable to suppose that when both parties kne'v 
that the property had failed to support a dairy operation 
that \ran Zyverden \vould have agreed to pay nearly 
$60,000 only to engage 111 a failing enterprise. The 
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parties <.'leurly ('onteinplated that the ranch ,,·ottld be 
used for the raising of l ivcs lock. 
S ccond: It is undi~ putL·d that , .. an Zyverden told 
l·,nrrar that he had no e;;sh or other capital to enable hin1 
to purchase beef or any other livestock. \'"an Zyverden 
testified directly that he told Farrar he \Vould have to 
operate the pren1ises fro1n the assets that were being 
sold. ~~arrar knew that u n l('ss livestock were placed on 
the pretnises, \,.an Zy\·erden could not reasonably expect 
to make the payments. l~'arrar knew that \"an Zyverden's 
econon1ic circutnstauee.'i "·ere such that the payn1ents 
required under the cot1tract could not be made unless he 
had the capital to operate on a paying basis; J4,arrar 
kne\v that ,.,. an Zyyerden had to make enough xnoney 
fron1 the ranch itself if the sellers were to realize the 
. price. 
'l"hird: Farrar k1 ~t~\\·· that under his agreement "·ith 
La l .. erda Lynn, \vhich had since been assigned by her 
to Maurice Mickelsen, there \vas a restriction upon the 
transferability of the base and that the base could not 
be transferred 'vithout l\Iickelsen's consent. But Farrar 
failed to disclose this fact to ,,. an Zyverden. Farrar 
admitted that he did not tell 'ran Zyverden anything 
about the limiation of the transferability of the milk base 
nt or prior to the time of the execution of the agreement 
(R. 576). He admitted that he did not ever sho"· the 
Lvnn contract to 'Tan ZvYerden. He testified that he 
~ . 
had "'mental reserYations" about the milk base at the 
ti1ne he signed the 'Tan ~~ ~ .. Yerden agreement but he did 
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not discuss them with 'ran Zrverden (R. 576-577). 
It is unreasonable to suppose that Farrar would have 
failed to advise Van Zyverden as to the reservations in 
the Lynn contract.unless Farrar had intended to under-
take the risk incident to making the exchange possible. 
In other words, whe11 F"'arrar looked at the language of 
the contract to the effect that the milk base "can be 
exchanged,'' he had to realize that if the base could not 
be exchanged he could not make a deal with 'ran Zyver-
den because \ran Zyverden expected to exchange the 
base, in effect, for the working capital necessary to 
operate the ranch. Farrar had to make the base ex-
changeable to make a deal with Van Zyverden. It is only 
reasonable and logical to assume, therefore, that in his 
own mind he undertook the risk incident to enabling 
the exchange. It is submitted that the compelling force 
of the argument cannot be answered by the appellants 
in this case. 
Fourth: After the agreement was signed, and when 
the time came to exchange the base, Farrar undertook 
to complete the exchange. Farrar admitted that his letter 
of December 24 to Hi-Land dairy approving Pert as 
a buyer and requesting that the base be transferred was 
sent at Mr. Van Zyverden's request and that the purpose 
of the letter was to enable the sale or exchange of the 
milk base pursuant to his agreement with Van Zyverden 
(R. 581, 582). Van Zyverden testified that after the 
parties were advised by Hi-Land that Mickelsen had 
refused to consent to the transfer, Farrar continued to 
represent to him that he would 'vork the 1natter out 'vith 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~lickelseu (R. ~111. ~>I~>) . ..t\.t no ti1ne did Ic,arrnr directly 
or indirectly deny this testimony. Farrar did not ever 
indicate to ,. an Zyverden, either directly or by impli-
cntion prior to the assignment to Seagull Investment 
(.'.ompany. that he did not expect to resolve the impasse 
with :\lickelsen. It is submitted that Farrar's atten1pt 
to perform den1onstrates unequivocally that he recog-
nized that he had an obligation to perform. He kne\v 
thut v· an Zyverden looked to him to make the exchange 
possible in order that cattle or other livestock could be 
ncquired to make the ranch pay out. It is significant 
that\?" an Zyverden made substantial improvements upon 
the premises during the spring of 1961 after the parties 
had been notified that Mickelsen declined to consent 
to the exchange. It is unreasonable to suppose that \ran 
Zyverden \vould have continued to make such improve-
tnents unless Farrar had continued to assure him, as he 
testified, that he \vould work the matter out "·ith Mickel-
sen so that the place could be successfully operated. 
'fhe trial court obviously ignored the intentions 
of the parties as reflected by their own testimony and 
their conduct at the time and subsequent to the agree-
Inent. It is significant that the trial court did not make 
a finding as to the intentions of the parties. It simply 
determined ''that the wording of the contract and the 
evidence offered by the plaintiffs fails to support plain-
tiffs' clain1'' (R. 189). The findings incorporate the 
contract bet"·een the parties by reference (Finding 
Xo. 2, R. :!04) :tnd the court found that the purpose 
of the Dece1nber 27 letter from Farrar to Hi-Land 
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dairy was "to bring about the sale or exchange of the 
milk base pursuant to the F.,arrar-'ran Zyverden agree-
ment" (Finding No. 6, R. 205), but the findings simply 
say that "the Van Zyverdens were not damaged by any 
default of the defendants in this action" 'vithout any 
interpretation of the intention of the parties, either 'vith 
respect to the language of the written agreement itself 
or their contemporaneous conduct. Particularly, since 
the interpretation of their intention is the central issue 
in the case, the failure of the court to make a finding as 
to their intention in the light of all the circumstances 
requires reversal. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE VAN ZYVERDENS 'VERE 
NOT DAMAGED BY SELLERS' DEFAULT. 
The Van Zyverdens, in effect, conveyed personal 
property to the Farrars of the agreed value of $5,000 
as down payment on the premises. In the event the 'ran 
Zyverdens were required to forfeit their interest, this 
consideration would be totally lost. In addition, they 
made capital expenditures in the nature of permanent 
improvements on the premises of a value of $8,212.49, 
including the reasonable value of their own labor (R. 
220-222). A forfeiture \vould result in the loss of these 
improvements and would unjustly benefit the sellers 
and their assignee, Seagull Investment Company. 
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~~ven n1ore itnportunt to the \ran Zyverdens is the 
faet thut they have been deprived of the use of the 
pretnises for the purposes anticipated by them and the 
J.1,arrurs at the titne of the purchase agreement. 'fhey 
have been denied reasonably anticipated profits during 
the two years that the sellers were in default. 
Since Hadley v. Balrcndalc ( 1854), 9 Ex. Ch. 341. 
the la '" has been clear that loss of profits are recoverable 
\rhen they are provable with reasonable certainty, and 
\vhere they are 'vithin the contemplation of both parties 
as a probable result of a breach. The case is discussed in 
1"'ictorial Laundry 'l'. Newman Industries, ( 1941) I All 
Eng. 997, where it 'vas held that a person 'vho promised 
to deliYer a large boiler to a laundry ""here it \vas needed 
for immediate use in the business had reason to foresee 
loss of profits for business that the use of the boiler \vould 
tnake possible. Section 331 of the Restatement on Con-
tracts states the rule as follows : 
"Damages are recoverable for losses caused or 
for profits and other gains prevented by the 
breach only to the extent that the evidence affords 
a sufficien"t basis for estimating their amount in 
money \\"ith reasonable certainty." 
Illustrations 4, 5, and 10 are helpful in applying the 
general principle to the case at bar. 
"-t. A sells seed to B, ~,·arranted by A to be 
Bristol cabbage seed. The seed is worthless mixed 
seed; but 'vhile una""are of this, B sets out 105,-
000 plants raised fron1 it. The ~rop produced is 
aood onlv for cattle. B has a right to the Yalue h • 
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of a crop of Bristol cabbage that would be pro-
duced under the existing conditions, less the value 
of the crop that is actually produced, if his evi-
dence gives a sufficient basis for estimating these 
a1nounts. 
"5. A contracts to permit his established coal 
mine to be operated by B and to pay B $1.60 per 
ton for coal produced. The mine has been oper-
a ted for a long period and its veins are well est a b-
lished. In an action for A's breach, by preventing 
B from operating the mine, B proves satisfac-
torily that the mine has regularly produced 200 
tons per day at a net cost of $1.40 per ton. The 
profits that B would have made from operating 
the mine are not too uncertain for inclusion in the 
damages awarded. 
* * * 
"'10. A employs B as master of a whaling ship 
on a five-year voyage, the compensation to be a 
share of the net proceeds of oil taken on the 
voyage. After two years B is "rrongfully dis-
charged and at once brings action. Although 
the earnings of the ship after B's discharge are 
contingent and uncertain, B may be able to lay 
a sufficient basis for their estimation by giving 
evidence of the conditions and experience in the 
whaling industry." 
This court approved an instruction permitting a 
loss of anticipated profits in Park 'V. Moorman Manu-
facturing Co. (1952), 121 Gt. 339, 241 P. (2d) 914. 
It is undisputed in the instant case that the parties 
discussed and agreed upon the concept that profits could 
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operuted as a livestock enterprise, and that the \Tan 
Zyverdens \vould have to convert son1e of the existing 
:lssets subject to the sale to livestock to enable then1 to 
operate on this basis. I>laintifi's offered to prove a speci-
fi<' series of conversations bet,veen \Tan ZyYerden and 
~~arrar in 'vhich I~~arrar "·as advised in substance and 
cfi'cet that the sale of the tnilk base and equipment 'vould 
provide sufficient cash to purchase approximately 100 
head of cal Yes in the early part of the season and that the 
ralves could expect to gain two pounds per day during 
the grazing season. Mr. ~,arrar acknowledged the ac-
curaey of Van Zyverden's analysis of the proposed oper-
ation and his projection of profits. Van Zyverden offered 
further to testify that he \vas acquainted with the prices 
of cattle and livestock during the spring and sum1ner 
of 1961 and that such profit as was available frotn in-
crease of weight on cattle during that P.eriod of time 
\vould hav·e been sufficient to enable him to make the 
paytnents on the contract. The evidence was offered in 
support of t\vo propositions: 
First, that the parties in fact contend that the obli-
gation to pay "·as conditioned upon performance of the 
obligations of the sellers to obtain the transfer of the 
base, and secondly, under the rule of Hadley v. Baxen-
dale and Section 330-331 of the Restatement on Con-
tracts ( R. 524-526) . 
rfhe court rejected the offer of proof. It is impor-
tant to observe that the basis of the court's ruling was 
that future profits \Vere not recoverable and not that the 
offer of proof "·as insufficient ( R. 523) . 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is submitted that the ruling of the court denying 
the plaintiffs inN o. 2-i49 the right to recover for loss of 
profits under the circumstances of this case is clearly 
erroneous and requires reversal. In the event of the 
court should be of the view that the record is insufficient 
at this time to prove or calculate actual da1nages, the 
trial court should be instructed to hold an additional 
hearing so that actual1narket quotations on beef for the 
spring and fall of 1961 can be included in the record. 
Actually, such damages can be computed by reference 
to readily available market data. There are approxi-
mately 180 days of grazing available in the Heber 
'Talley. At two pounds per day, 100 head of cattle \vould 
gain 200 pounds per day or 36,000 pounds. At 25c per 
pound, the amount of gain per year would be $9,000.00. 
Upon analysis, there is no more reason for denying 
promisee loss of profits as an ultimate of damage than 
loss of any other benefit of his bargain. Corbin analyzes 
the problem as follows: 
"A profit is the net pecuniary gain from a 
transaction. The profit to be made from a con-
tract by one of the parties thereto is the full value 
of the performance promised him by the other 
party, diminished by the cost of his own perform-
ance that he contracts to render in exchange." 
Where the profit \vas in terms of a cormnodity hav-
ing a definite and relatively uniform market price a loss 
of profits should no more be denied than if the contract 
was for the exchange of two commodities, cf. the dis-
cussion in Corbin supra, pp. 119-120. Even if loss of 
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profits is not recoverable. there is no reason for denvi1,,,. 
.. ~ 
rcco,·ery of the $1:J,812.49 invested in the property if 
forfeiture is required as the result of the seller's o\\·n 
conduct. 
POINT III. 
'1'HE SELLERS' BREACH GI\ , .. ~~ RISE 
'l'O A CAlTSE 0~" .r\CTION BY THE IJUY-
ERS FOR DA~IAGES, OR SPECI~"Il~ PER-
~"ORMANCE, OR BOTH, AGAINS'r SEA-
(~ULL IN\"ES'l"~IEN'f CO~IPANY. 
A. The assutll]Jtivn of the Sellers' duties and liabili-
ties under the Van Zyvcrdcn-Farrar agrcc1nent Teas Ct?'-
pressly assumed by Seagull. 
The court found that "On or about X ovember 1, 
1961, the Farrars assigned their interest under the \ran 
Zyverden contract to Seagull Investment Company. 
'fhe ~-.,arrar-Seagull assignment is in writing and in-
corporated herein by reference, and provides in sub-
stance that the assignees will perform the provisions 
of the\" an Zyverden agreen1ent and will hold the assign-
ors harmless from any claim or demand arising from 
any act or otnission of the assignee.'' 
The assignment is in evidence as Exhibit X o. 10. 
Paragraph 3 (a) expressly provides that the assignee 
\viii perforn1 all of the obligations of the assignor. 
B. The bu}Jer is entitled to assert a remedy for spe-
cific ]Jerfornlancc "lt)ith apprOJJriate abatement constitut-
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ing compensatory damages for the loss ~·ustained VlJ 
Sellers~ breach. 
'Tan Zyverdens proposed that the amount of Inoney 
which they were entitled to receive as damages for the 
sellers' breach be applied against the obligations of the 
buyers under the contract, and that the sellers be re-
quired to convey in accordance with their contractual 
obligations after having made such credit. It 'vas sug-
gested that there was an applicable analogy to the situ-
ation "~here specific performance with abatement could 
be obtained in situations where the seller of land was 
unable to convey all that he had bargained for under 
an executory real estate contract. 
Corbin states the abatement principle as follows: 
"If a vendor is inable to transfer title to all 
of the land that he contracted to transfer, or if 
there are defects in his title that he cannot 
remove, the vendee may desire such performance 
as is within the vendor's ability. In such cases the 
vendee can get specific performance with respect 
to the part that the vendor can transfer, with 
compensation, an abatement in price proportion-
ate to the deficiency or defect, or an indemnity 
against future injury. 'l.,hus, if one has contracted 
to transfer complete title, and his wife who has 
a dower interest refuses to join in the deed, the 
vendee can con1pel a transfer of such interest as 
the promisor has, "'ith an abate1nent for the value 
of the "rife's interest. It has been so held even 
though the vendee kne"~ when the contract 'vas 
made that the wife had an interest and was not 
bound to join in the conveyance." Corbin on 
Contracts, 'T ol. 5, p. 687. 
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'rhe san1e rule appears in the Restate1nent of the 
l:t\\' of l'.ontracts in Section 365. Illustration 3 to the 
stl'tion is as follows: 
""3. 1\ contracts to transfer land in fee sitnple 
to B. A is unable to perform in full because of 
the existence of a building restriction. IJ rna v be 
given a decree for the transfer by A of ~uch 
!nterest as he has, 'vith compensation or an abate-
ment for the building restriction." 
In the instant case, the Farrars agreed to the sale 
of specific real and personal property, and as a part of 
the consideration to be paid by the buyers, agreed in 
addition that they would enable the exchange of part of 
these assets to be convertible to other property in order 
that the ranch might be successfully operated. It is 
suggested that ... \ran Zyverden received less than the pro-
tnised perforn1ance in a manner comparable to the buyer 
'rho receives less acreage than the seller has agreed to 
convey. Damages can properly be assessed in a dollar 
stun and applied against the purchase price, including 
interest, and other ite1ns agreed to be discharged by the 
buyer in the purchase contract. The analogy to the 
abaternent principle is particularly useful in the instant 
case because it \vould prevent the sellers from benefiting 
frotn their own wrong. 
It is obvious from the record in this case that the value 
of the property has substantially increased between 
the time the contract 'vas executed and the time of trial. 
'fhere is evidence before the court to the effect that the 
present Yalue of the property would be approximately 
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$85,000. If the sellers successfully forfeit the buyers' 
interest under the circumstances here, they '"ill ha\·e 
deprived buyers of the real fruits of the agreement 
through their own conduct. This is an instance 'vhere 
damages and specific performance should both be pro-
vided to place the parties in their respective positions 
to the same extent as though the contract had originally 
been discharged by the parties in accordance with their 
initial intentions. While no case has been found expli-
citly adjudicating the kind of result requested by the 
'Tan Zyverdens, it is submitted that the court has suffi-
ciently broad powers to achieve the indicated result and 
that such result 'vould achieve substantial justice be-
tween the parties. 
POINT IV. 
SEAGULL CANNOT RECO,:ER l1"'0R 
UNLA ''TFUL DETAINER. 
A. The trial court correctly ruled that unlawful 
detainer was not established at the time of the trial. 
Even assuming that the plaintiff was in default 
under Exhibit 1, the defendant Seagull must, in order 
to succeed in its unlawful detainer action, prove that the 
plaintiff was given the requisite statutory notice. Carsten 
v. Hansen (1944), 107 Ut. 234, 152 P.(2d) 954. 'fhis 
the defendant has failed to do. 
Utah's unlawful detainer statute only applies to 
tenants of real property for a tern1 less than life ( 78-36-
30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a tT.<...,.A.). ~\s this eourt hus noted in the case of ]Jcar('c 
t'. Schurt.:· (1954),:! Ut. (2d) 1:!-t, 270 P. (2d) -t42. th(' 
rt·lntionship of vendor-,·endee under a Unifortn Real 
~~state l.,ontract is not one of landlord-tenant to "·hicl, 
the unlawful detainer statute applies. 'fhe court sa irl: 
··In a situation '"here title is held until payment is conl-
plcte. the general conclusion to be drawn is that a con-
ditional sale or mortgagor-mortgagee relationship 
exists.'' Ibid at 127, Utah Reporter. 
Under paragraph 16 (a) of Exhibit 1. the seller has 
the election, upon the buyer's default, to serve the buyer 
\rith written notice to remedy such default, and "upon 
failure of the buyer to re1nedy the default \vi thin fiye ( ~j) 
days after written notice ... the buyer agrees that the 
seller tnay, at his option, re-enter and take possession of 
said pretnises "~ithout legal processes as in its former 
estate, together with all improvements and additions 
made by the buyer thereon, and the said additions and 
improvements shall retnain 'vith the land and become 
the property of the seller;, the buyer becoming at once 
a tenant at u:ill of the seller .. . n (Emphasis supplied.) 
'fhus it is only upon the buyer's failure to remedy 
a default within fiYe days after written notice that a 
landlord-tenant relationship, to \vhich the unlavtrful de-
tainer statute applies, is created. 
Again. this court noted in the Pearce case, provi-
sions such as the one set forth above in paragraph 16 (a) 
of }~xhibit 1 "·ere "'undoubtedly adopted to obtain the 
benefits of the unla"~ful detainer statute." (Ibid at 127.) 
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If, however, Seagull Investment Company seeks 
to claim the benefits of the unlawful detainer statute, 
it must comply with the requirements of that statute, 
and under that statute a tenant at will is only "guilty of 
an unlawful detainer" if he remains in possession "after 
the expiration of a notice of not less than five days'' 
(57 -36-3 U.C.A.). 
In this case the defendant Seagull did serve the 
plaintiff on or about the 3rd day of January, 1962, 'rith 
a five-day Notice to Vacate Premises (see Notice at-
tached to Exhibit 5) and pursuant to such notice on 
page 2 notified the plaintiff that it was electing to exer-
cise its rights pursuant to paragraph 16 (a) of Exhibit 1, 
and further gave the plaintiff five days to remedy the 
alleged defaults. 
Even assuming that the defendant was in default 
and that he failed to cure such defaults within five days 
after the service of the above mentioned Notice, Seagull 
could not successfully maintain an unlawful detainer 
action against the plaintiff until it had served the plain-
tiff with the requisite five-day statutory notice. The first 
notice, pursuant to paragraph 16 (a), did not suffice 
for the statutory notice because only upon the failure 
of the plaintiff after five days to remedy the alleged 
defaults \vould a landlord-tenant relationship exist to 
which the unla,vful detainer statute can apply, and the 
landlord-tenant relationship could then only be termi-
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1'/tis ala t u tor.tJ five-da.IJ not icc 1.cas net't'r scrt·l'd 
upon the plaintiff' JJrior to the tintc that defendant's 
action for unla"lcful detainer was c·unl7ncnccd, either b.11 
suit l'i'l.,il ~\"o. ~456 or in its counterclaim to suit Gliril 
.\' o. ~4-19. (See return of service attached to Exhibit ~)). 
Subsequent to the conunencement of defendant Sea-
gull's action for unlawful detainer, the defendants. in 
eft'ect recognizing the validity of the plaintiff's position 
on the inadequacy of notice, caused a second notice 
(Exhibit ~)) to be served on the plaintiff. This notice 
\Vas \\·holly abortive, however, in the present cases. Sea-
gull has now atten1pted to file an appropriate supple-
Inental pleading. Moreover, Exhibit ~> expressly pro-
vides that it shall "in no way affect the existing legnl 
proceedings." All the pleadings in the cases before the 
court are predicated upon the first notice, '"hich, as 
shown, failed to satisfy the requirements of the statute. 
Seag·ull is asking the court to apply a drastic and 
penal remedy. It simply has not brought itself "·ithin 
the statutory requirements to enable itself to maintain 
the alleged remedy in the present actions." 
B. S cay ull has waived any rights to recover for 
unla~cful detainer under the notices introduced at the 
trial. 
Both during the time the lawsuit was pending and 
after the trial date, Seagull was demanding that the,.,. an 
Zyverdens make the annual payments and discharge 
the oblig·ation for taxes and insurance for the year end-
ing· X oven1ber 30, 1962. At the time of the notices 
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introduced at the trial, Seagull was clai1ning a default 
only for alleged deficient performances through the fall 
of 1961. 
The record now shows that in July, 1963, Seagull 
served upon the \~an Zyverdens a ''Notice to Remedy 
Default or to Quit" in which it was claimed that \Tan 
Zyverdens \-vere indebted for the payments for the years 
1962 as 'veil as 1961, and a demand was made "that you 
remedy all your defaults in the performance of your 
obligations" under the contract within five days (R. 723-
725). Even since the judgment of the trial court, there-
fore, Seagull has taken a legal position inconsistent with 
its right to recover for unlawful detainer or obtain any 
other rights under the prior notices. Certainly Seagull 
cannot argue that the \Tan Zyverdens were tenants at 
will in F..,ebruary, 1962. and at the same time Seagull 
was entitled to receive a payment due from them, as 
buyer, in November, 1962. 
It is generally held that the taking of a legal posi-
tion inconsistent with the forfeiture of the buyer's in-
terest under an executory land contract waives any 
right obtained by the seller under a notice of forfeiture. 
The editor of an annotation at 107 ALR 395 states: 
"An option to forfeit because of default oc-
curring as to a particular payment or payments 
is waived by the Yenor's adoption of a legal rem-
edy inconsistent "·ith such forfeiture ... 
''Thus an action to recoYer the unpaid pur-
chase 1noney, or a part thereof, is a "·aiYer of any 
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right of' forfeiture Leeause of the non-paytnent 
of such 1noney ... ( l,iliug cases.) 
In ( 1/ark 'l,. -L\rt'lliiUUlfl ( 1H98) 56 ~eb. 36~, 76 X.\\r. 
892. a vendor "·aived a 11otiee of declaration of forfeiture 
and then attetnpted to e11force the contract. It \Vas held 
that he \\·aived the benefit of the notice. 'rhe court said: 
"'lr pon these faets, \Ve think the defendants 
arc not in an attitude to insist that there \\ras an 
effective reseiss ion of the contracts. They "·ere 
treated by botl1 parties as being in full force and 
effect. The <·on'p:tlly recognized their valiclity. 
and waived the rig·ht of forfeiture by atten1pting 
to enforce thetn . " 
A fortiori whPre a "lcller's right is claimed to be 
for unla,vful detainer. the assertion of a claim incon-
sistent \vith the notice declaring the buyer's interest 
forfeited and making the buyer a tenant at \viii is "·aived 
by a demand of a pa~-tnen due on the contract after 
the notice was served. 
It should be rcalizt·d by the court that the \"'"an 
Zyverdens do not take an inconsistent position when 
they urge the court to rule that the prior notices were 
insufficient under the unla "yful detainer statute and that 
the subsequent conduct of Seagull constitutes a waiver 
of the notices. Unla,vful detainer is a penal and harsh 
remedy. Not only does Seagull attempt to obtain a 
judgment for treble dan1ages, it seeks at the same time 
to forfeit values of approximately $18,000 which , ... an 
Zyverdens could have either paid to the sellers or put 
into the property in tern1s of permanent improvements. 
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The court should not be sympathetic to invoke its p<n,·ers 
to aid Seagull under these circumstances. 
It is, of course, well established la'" that the party 
to an executory contract guilty of a first breach cannot 
maintain an action on the agreement. See Restatement 
on Contracts, Section 278, comment (a) . As Cross-
Appellants establish under Points I and II of this 
brief, Seagull was in default prior to the time 'vhen 
the buyer's payments became due. The default con-
sisted of a failure to cause the performance of the con-
dition precedent. The damages sustained by the buyers 
should be off-set against the liabilities for these pay-
ments. (See argument in Point III of this brief). On 
this basis, the notices of defaults were wholly abortive 
and of no effect because the obligations of the buyers 
were postponed until the equities and rights of the par-
ties were adjusted as a result of seller's default. 
Even, however, if the court disagrees with the posi-
tion taken by the buyers on Points I, II and III of 
this brief, Seagull cannot prevail upon any unlawful 
detainer theory for the reasons stated in this point of 
the brief. 
It is submitted that under any theory, the trial 
court's judgment denying Seagull restitution of the 
premises should be affirmed. 
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I>OIN'l" \". 
SE.c\GLTLL SIIOULD :NO'l" BE PElt:\II'f-
'l'~D 'rO IJENE~"l'l" F"ROjl ITS OWN ERRORS 
.L\XD INl~ONSIS'l"ENCIES. 
'l'he relief sought by Seagull in this litigation is 
hasieally punitive. It seeks damages for unlawful de-
tainer~ it is attempting to forfeit the interest acquired 
hy the buyers in the Daniels Creek Ranch; it has re-
s is ted consistently efforts of the buyers to adjust the 
equities of the parties either through negotiations or 
pursuant to the original action filed by the buyers in 
\\r asatch County. 
Despite the fact that it seeks the imposition of the 
hnrsh remedies incident to unlawful detainer, it has 
pursued a course of blunders and inconsistencies. Yet 
it asks this court on appeal in effect to do its work for 
it, to excuse it from its inconsistencies, and to require 
the \"an Zyverdens to bear the entire brunt of its own 
errors. 
'l"o begin "·ith, 'ran Zyverdens filed case No. 2-:t49 
in ''' asatch County to obtain an orderly and peaceable 
adjudication of their equities under the contract. The 
record is clear beyond question that as long as the 
sellers' position '"as assumed by ~Ir. and Mrs. Farrar 
under the original ,.,. an Zyverden-Farrar contract, the 
~"arrars were attempting to "\vork out a reasonable and 
orderly adjustment of the problems involved as a result 
of their not having been able to obtain the transfer of 
the 1nilk base pursuant to the ,.,. an Zyverden agreen1ent. 
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As soon as Seagull obtained the Farrar agreement, it 
arbitrarily started making demands (R. 32-33). 
When Van Zqverdens filed the complaint in X o. 
2449 and served summons upon Seagull, it did not file 
an answer or otherwise respond in that action until 
after a default certificate was entered. While Seagull 
was still in default, it filed certain requests for adnlis-
sions ( R. 26-29) . At this time it had no standing in 
the case. It was not entitled to have any response made 
to the requests because its default had been entered. 
Yet Seagull argues in its brfief that it is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law because such requests 
'vere not denied by the Van Zyverdens. 
Rather than filing its purported claims against 
the ,,.. an Zyverdens as compulsory counterclaims under 
Rules 12 and 13, Seagull filed a separate complaint but 
the complaint was insufficient as far as unla,yful de-
tainers is concerned because no notice had been required 
at that time as provided in the statute. See the authori-
ties cited in Point IV. At the pretrial, Judge 'l~uckett 
indicated that if the Van Zyverdens were in default 
one of the remedies available to Seagull was foreclosure. 
He indicated that Seagull could not recover attorney's 
fees if it was proceeding in unlawful detainer on a tort 
theory rather than for restitution under the contract. 
Seagull expressly, voluntarily, elected to proceed in 
unlawful detainer for treble damages rather than on 
some other theory ( R. 206, para. 1:2). 'rhis election \ras 
1nade Yoluntarily at the pretrial by Seagull. Certainly 
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if Seagull l'ontends that the \ .. an Zyverdens are tenants 
at \\'ill and the unla\vful detainer statute is applicable, 
they cannot at the same ti1ne contend that the \""an 
Zyverdens are buyers under the contract and should be 
subjected to un}a,vful attorney's fees for the enfor< e-
Jnent of rights given the seller under such agreement. 
It is not suggested that the sellers did not have a cause 
of' aetion for damages for buyers' default if they were 
in default prior to termination of the agreement, but 
if \"an Zyverdens' interest under the contract are ter-
Jninated, then the sellers' rights under the contract are 
ter1ninated at the same time. It is certainly impossible 
to assert a remedy for restitution against 'ran Zyverdens 
as buyers if they are not buyers but tenants at will. The 
ehoice as to 'vhether 'ran Zyverdens were to be treated 
as tenants at will or buyers was one voluntarily made 
by Seagull. Yet it asserts in its brief that it is entitled 
to have the court make that choice for it, to award it 
restitution and attorney's fees as though the choice had 
not been made. 
During the trial, Seagull offered Exhibit 5 in evi-
dence and objection was 1nade on the ground that it 
'vas immaterial. Repeatedly since the day of the trial 
"·hen the offer "~as made, counsel for 'ran Zyverdens 
has suggested that the appropriate and orderly method 
of procedure ,,~as that a supplemental complaint be 
filed to enable the court to adjudicate the issues raised 
by the service of Exhibit 5. Seagull has stubbornly 
refused and neglected to atten1pt to n1ake any such 
:unendment. Judge Tuckett had the case under advise-
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ment for three months before he issued a ruling. 'fhere 
'vas plenty of opportuntiy to file a supple1nental plead-
ing during that time. Seagull "'as adYised orally and 
by the briefs filed by the ,..,. an Zy,yerdens that the court 
could not rule on the questions raised on Exhibit ~3 
until supplemental pleadings 'vere filed bringing into 
the service of the notice served after the filing of the 
complaint. This court knows well that the \ran Zyver-
dens made the same suggestion in connection 'vith the 
issuance of the extraordinary writ by this court in 
No. 9917, following the filing of a new case by Seagull 
in Salt Lake County. 
Even after the issuance of the writ in No. 9917 
Seagull persisted in its stubborn refusal to bring the 
pleading·s to date in the Wasatch County cases by the 
filing of a motion for leave to file a supplemental plead-
ing or otherwise. In fact, Seagull apparently realized 
at that point that it could not successfully proceed 
under the existing notices which were in issue in the 
Wasatch County cases. The record shows that after 
the issuance of the extraordinary 'vrit by this court 
in No. 9917, Seagull served upon the ';ran Zyverdens 
two additional notices. The first of these notices was 
served on about July 8, 1963 (R. 723-726, 729). It 
demands payment for the annual payments allegedly 
due during N ove1nber, 1962. This notice constitutes a 
clear recognition of the rights of the 'Tan Zyverdens as 
buyers under the contract and a demand for the enforce-
Inent of their oblig·ations a:; buyers after the service 
of Exhibit 5, and in fact at all tin1es prior to the date 
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ot' the service of the notice, nnn1ely July 8, 19t>a. 'rht." 
seeond notice attetnpts to require the \ran Zyverdens 
to quit the subject premises \vithin five days. Appar-
ently it \vas served at a time between J u}y 8 and .J ul,· 
. . 
:!H, 1963, the exaet date not appearing in the record. 
This court can take notice of the fact that Seagull 
thereafter filed a second complaint in Salt Lake County, 
despite the prohibition of the \vrit in No. 9917. 'fhe 
second case was filed in Aug·ust, 1963. It consists of 
four causes of action and the prayer detnands judg-
Inent for the paytnents allegedly due frotn the ,,.. an 
Zyverdens as buyers under the real estate contract in 
question, including interest, taxes and 'vater assess-
tnents for the years 1961 and 196:2. It is thus clear that 
Seagull is now attempting to obtain judgment for 
payments tnade after the service of Exhibit 5 and after 
the titne of the trial. In other words, Seagull is now 
asking this court to determine that it is entitled to 
restitution of the premises and a judgment for unlawful 
detainer by reason of notices served not later than 
February, 1962 and at the same time it is urging the 
District Court of Salt Lake County to determine that 
it is entitled to a judgment for payments which the 
, ... an Zyverdens purportedly o've as buyers in November, 
1962. 
Seagull urges this court to hold that Judge Tuckett 
should have made a final judgment determining the ulti-
nlate rights of the parties in accordance '"ith Rule 54 (c) 
(I). (Appellant~s brief, 19-20). It is submitted that 
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Seagull has the responsibility of placing before the trial 
court the appropriate pleadings and theories upon \vhich 
it claims relief. Assuming that the 'ran Zyverdens are 
in default, Seagull has the right to n1ake so1ne election 
of remedies. It cannot require the court to make the elec-
tion if it chooses the wrong course. There is no 'vay that 
Seagull can place upon this court the burden of reliev-
ing it from its inconsistencies. 
The ,,. an Zyverdens have attempted from the 
beginning in this action to obtain an orderly adjudication 
of their rights under the agreement. They believe that 
it would now be appropriate for this court to remand 
the cause to Wasatch County with instructions to deter-
mine the balances due back and forth between the parties 
and to enter an appropriate decree for damage against 
an offending party. If the Van Zyverdens are not 
entitled to recover any damages, or if additional evi-
dence is required to make more certain any amount of 
damages \\'hich they should receive, these questions can 
be appropriately determined by the District Court of 
Wasatch County under the original pleadings in No. 
2449. If supplemental pleadings are required at this 
time to bring to date any relevant facts or events which 
have occurred since the filing of the original pleadings 
in No. 2449, leave might even now be given to amend 
to permit appropriate adjudication of the issues. The 
\Tan Zyverdens insist, however, that the judgment of 
the District Court with respect to the disposition of Sea-
gull's present con1plaint is entirely appropriate and 
should be sustained absent appropriate amendments by 
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~cagull. 'l'he urgutnents 'vhich Seagull now tnakes iu 
Point I \r of its brief, that it should be awarded some 
relief 'vhether sueh relief is de1nanded or not, and in 
Points l' and \r I that it is entitled to so1ne atnount in 
d:unages and for attorney's fees under the present status 
of the record are spurious. 'l.,he arguments Inade under 
}loint I of Seagull's brief that certain statements in 
requests for ad1nissions are admitted cannot be taken 
seriously in this litig·a tion. Judge '.fuckett at least twice 
denied Seagull's 1notions for sutnmary judgment 'vhen 
it tnnde the sa1ne argument. The basis of the court's 
ruling \vas substantially that the information otherwise 
contained in the file appropriately advised Seagull of 
the vie"·s of the "\:'"an Zyverdens and that Seagull had 
no standing at the time its requests were filed. 
It is suggested that Seagull's arguments, to the 
effect that amendments and supplements to pleadings 
should be made by the court even in the absence of any 
tender of such pleadings by Seagull, are captious. 
lr nder all of the circumstances in this case, it seems 
fair to suggest to the court that Seagull's real interest 
here is to proceed in such a manner that the 'ran Zyver-
dens haYe no actual or genuine opportunity to realize 
the present values of the property. If Seagull genuinely 
desires an orderly adjudication of the real issues, it has 
had plenty of opportunity to present them to the court 
for deter1nina tion. 
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SUM~lARY AND l~ONCLUSION 
'fhe judgment of the trial court denying relief to 
Seagull under the status of the existing pleadings was 
entirely appropriate and should be affirmed. 'l.,he trial 
court erred in failing to determine that the parties in-
tended that the seller assumed the obligation of enabling 
the buyer to convert the milk base and equipment to 
livestock and that such failure constituted a breach by 
the seller. It further erred in denying the ,---an Zyverdens 
the right to prove damages in the nature of loss of 
profits. 'This court should remand the case to the trial 
court with instructions to make appropriate findings, 
particularly with respect to the amount of damages 
sustained by Van Zyverdens. 
In the event this court feels that Seagull has not 
had a reasonable opportunity to a1nend its pleadings, 
despite all of the facts and circumstances appearing in 
the record, it is submitted that this court has the power 
to permit appropriate amendments and supplemental 
pleadings upon remand. 
Respectfully submitted this 't'th day of October, 
1963. 
GEORGE ~1. ~Ic~IILLAN 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
AttornelJ for Van Zyverdens 
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